Fake Accounts and Sponsored Ads: A Network of Disinformation and Digital Incitement Against Refugees in Libya
17/06/2026Beam Observatory
This investigation was originally published in Arabic by Beam Reports on 17 June 2026. Refugees in Libya has translated and republished it in English to make its findings accessible to a wider audience.
“Beam Reports” identified a network of 70 Facebook pages created within just a few days in May 2026, coinciding with the escalation of protests against refugees and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Libya.
These pages operate under the names of Libyan cities, neighbourhoods and tribes. Each page has between 30,000 and 55,000 followers, acquired within a short period of time, bringing the network’s total following to more than two million.
The pages have coordinated the publication of videos inciting hostility against refugees, including scenes of verbal and physical violence and explicitly racist content, as well as misleading videos used to reinforce their narrative and attack the UN Refugee Agency.
These videos, particularly the sponsored ones, have received millions of views.
Behavioural patterns across the network reveal clear central coordination: the pages were created on closely corresponding dates, their naming methods are strikingly similar, and most of them publish the same content within minutes of one another.
Most importantly, the network does not rely solely on organic distribution. It also finances its content through paid advertising campaigns on Meta, in clear violation of the company’s policies regarding hate speech and incitement. Tracking the data associated with these advertisements led to an advertising company based in the Souq Al-Jumaa neighbourhood of Tripoli called Ekhlas Albayan. The company’s information appeared as the sponsor of several of these advertisements.
The network’s activity coincided with large-scale deportation campaigns carried out by Libyan authorities in both eastern and western Libya against refugees and migrants, raising serious questions about the nature of the relationship between the digital campaign and developments on the ground.
The investigation also detected signs that the network’s influence had spread beyond Libya, with Egyptian and Tunisian accounts using its content to inflame attitudes toward refugees in their own countries.
How the Story Began
Protests against refugees in Libya began some time ago. Since the beginning of 2025, voices opposing refugees have become increasingly prominent. On 7 May 2025, the page “Tripoli Activists Movement Against Settlement and Resettlement” was created in opposition to what it described as attempts by international organisations to settle foreigners in Libya. It now leads a significant part of the anti-refugee mobilisation.
This was not the first time demonstrations rejecting resettlement had taken place in Libya. Waves of violence had appeared from time to time. Last October, protesters took to the streets carrying signs rejecting the settlement of migrants. Those protests continued, although at a low intensity and intermittently.
In recent days, these protests escalated to an unprecedented level. They expanded following the circulation on social media of fabricated statements attributed to the head of UNHCR in Libya, in which she was falsely claimed to have threatened Libyans who attacked migrants with bans on entering Europe, while promising to regularise refugees’ legal documents and grant them rights to education, healthcare and employment.
There was also widespread circulation of details concerning the European Pact on Migration and Asylum signed by European states, which was expected to enter into force on 12 June 2026. These alleged statements, together with reports about the European pact and its timing, provoked anger among sections of the Libyan public, who viewed them as evidence of an attempt to consolidate the idea of settling refugees in their country.
After the protests expanded, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya denied claims that refugees were to be resettled in the country. The protests nevertheless continued.
On 4 June, the “Tripoli Activists Movement” issued a widely circulated statement calling for the closure of UNHCR and the immediate deportation of refugees, alongside several other demands. The statement also threatened a nationwide general strike if all of its demands were not implemented.
The two Libyan governments adopted broadly similar positions on refugees, although with differing levels of severity. The Government of National Unity, headed by Abdulhamid Dbeibah, rejected through its representative to the United Nations any settlement of migrants or establishment of camps for them. Meanwhile, the prime minister and Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained silent regarding violence and demonstrations directed against UNHCR and refugees.
The eastern government, headed by Osama Hammad, was more explicit. It issued a statement describing the fight against resettlement as a “sovereign issue” and instructed security and military bodies to enforce the law combating the settlement of foreigners.
In both cases, neither government intervened to stop the escalating wave of violence against refugees.
On the ground, deportation campaigns have continued since the beginning of June, while official bodies have not disclosed the total number of people deported. However, the Department for Combating Illegal Migration publishes daily updates on Facebook indicating that the number has reached thousands.
The campaign has affected several African nationalities, particularly Sudanese, Egyptians, Chadians and Nigerians, as well as Asian nationals from Bangladesh and Yemen.
During this wave of protests and intensive deportation campaigns, heavily circulated sponsored content was detected on Facebook that incited hostility against refugees and called for their expulsion and for violence against them. This prompted Beam Reports to investigate the pages behind the content.
How the Story Began
The observatory team identified dozens of pages created at roughly the same time and publishing content calling for refugees to be expelled and encouraging their expulsions. These calls targeted refugees broadly.
The pages also published content encouraging attacks on UNHCR, as well as videos of demonstrations in South Africa against the presence of foreigners, in an attempt to support their own demands and mobilise demonstrations against refugees.
The observatory team found that most of these pages were created between 2 and 7 May, with most established specifically on 2 and 3 May. This indicates a high degree of synchronisation and coordination in their creation. The team considers 2 May the likely starting point for the establishment of the network.
Images 5 to 10: Show the creation dates of some of the network’s accounts.
Images 11–16: Show the creation dates of some network pages that had active sponsored advertisements when the screenshots were taken.
These pages form part of the network of 70 pages identified as following the same pattern. The complete list of pages documented by the team and their details is available in a table at the end of the report.
The Network’s Objectives and Orientation
The pages concentrated on two principal lines of activity: attacking refugees and inciting their expulsion, and attacking UNHCR in Libya.
An account called “Souq Al-Jumaa Al-Marsi” published a video from a street containing text claiming that Libya had become full of Africans and calling for their documents to be checked. Another account named “Souq Al-Jumaa Al-Amrous” published the same video.
The team also identified a number of other accounts inciting hostility against migrants. The account “Dhana Misrata Al-Assiya” published a video of migrants while criticising security services for allegedly failing to arrest them.
Meanwhile, the account “Misrata Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous” published a video showing a security operation and described it as a popular uprising against migrants.
Images 18 and 19: Examples of content inciting hostility against refugees.
Among the network’s accounts was also “Souq Al-Jumaa Arada,” which on 3 June published an announcement for a major demonstration in the Al-Sarraj area, calling on the public to gather and protest against Africans and reject resettlement.
It is notable that large demonstrations against migrants and resettlement took place the following day, 4 June. These were the same demonstrations promoted by the account “Abu Salim Past and Present,” which described them as the beginning of a campaign against irregular migration.
Images 20 and 21: Examples of content calling for demonstrations against refugees.
In the same context, the account “Nalut Al-Jihad” published a video of a person filming cars in the street and complaining that their drivers were foreigners. The account called for security campaigns to be intensified in order to “clean the country,” in its words.
Violent and Racist Content Against Refugees
The network’s accounts did not limit themselves to calling for demonstrations against refugees or encouraging security agencies to intensify operations against them.
Accounts such as “Shabab Al-Khoms” encouraged people to pursue refugees in the streets. The account “Shabab Abu Salim” also published a video documenting the pursuit of refugees and called for them to be chased through the streets.
In the same context, “Abu Salim Past and Present” published a video of a person filming children in the streets of Tripoli, saying that the city was full of Africans and questioning whether the children had parents or families.
The same account posted another video showing a person in a street, accompanied by an offensive comment describing “all migrants” as “filth and disease.”
Images 23 and 24: Content encouraging violence against refugees.
Images 25 and 26: Racist content targeting refugees.
Attacks on UNHCR
At the same time, network pages became active in inciting hostility against UNHCR and calling for protests against it.
They coordinated the circulation of videos of demonstrations outside its headquarters. The account “Zawiyat Al-Dahmani at the Summit” shared a video from the account “Beit Al-Mal Street, Souq Al-Jumaa” with the comment, “Salute to the men.”
The video shows demonstrators closing the UNHCR headquarters with earth barriers.
The account “Tarhouna Libya” also shared a video from “Farjan Tarhouna” showing crowds outside the United Nations headquarters in Janzour.
Images 27 and 28: Examples of content circulated by network pages inciting hostility against UNHCR.
Similarly, the account “Abu Salim with the Libyan Army” published a screenshot taken from a widely circulated video, claiming that it showed a “temporary evacuation” of UNHCR.
It called on Libyans not to believe that UNHCR staff had left and encouraged all Libyans to demonstrate against refugees and the UN Refugee Agency.
Likewise, the account “Sons of Shurfat Al-Mallaha” published a video of protesters outside UNHCR headquarters denouncing resettlement and calling for the expulsion of the head of UNHCR in Libya, Carmen Sakhr.
The account also called on security services to intensify efforts to deport migrants.
Demonstrations Outside the Embassy of Qatar
Our team identified several accounts circulating videos of demonstrations outside the Qatari Embassy in Janzour.
The account “Bawabat Al-Dafniya” published the video alongside what it described as “the people’s demands,” calling on Qatar not to interfere in Libyan affairs.
At the same time, several other network accounts—including “Beit Al-Mal Street, Souq Al-Jumaa,” “Tarhouna Al-Sharshara,” “Misrata Volcano of Rage,” and “Tarhouna, Capital of Olives”—circulated the same video.
Misleading Content
The observatory team identified misleading content circulated by network accounts to reinforce their narrative against refugees and UNHCR.
The team noted that an account called “Free People of Al-Asabaa” circulated a video of Sudanese migrants in the desert, calling for their expulsion and for the country’s entrances to be closed.
Several network accounts, including “Al-Muqanna’in Zuwara,” circulated the same video.
The observatory’s investigation established that the video was misleading because it was old, dating back to February.
Images 32 and 33: Example of misleading content circulated by network accounts.
In the same context, the account “Central Tarhouna” promoted claims that UNHCR had evacuated its offices following an attack by protesters, using an image showing UNHCR staff with two children.
The observatory found that this claim was misleading. The photograph was old and had been published on the UNHCR website in January 2019 in connection with the evacuation of two Eritrean children from a detention facility in the Libyan city of Misrata and their reunification with their mother in Switzerland.
Images 34 and 35: Example of misleading content circulated by network accounts.
Regional Effects
The impact of the network’s content was not limited to migrants in Libya. It also affected refugees in other countries, including Egypt and Tunisia.
Its content was used against Sudanese refugees in Egypt. Egyptian accounts circulated posts about events in Libya, particularly deportations of Sudanese nationals, and called for similar measures against Sudanese refugees in Egypt.
Likewise, anti-migrant and anti-African movements in Tunisia used the same content to promote their demands and increase pressure on migrants inside Tunisia.
Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour
Our team observed several clear patterns in the network’s activity indicating coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
It identified 70 pages, most created between 2 and 7 May, with each page having between 30,000 and 55,000 followers.
These pages accumulated those follower numbers within a very short period, suggesting coordinated efforts and a campaign to increase follower counts.
The team also identified common patterns among these accounts. All of them use the names of Libyan cities, neighbourhoods or tribes, such as Souq Al-Jumaa, Misrata and Tarhouna.
The observatory also noted that the accounts frequently posted identical content at closely corresponding times.
For example, the account “Bani Walid, Graveyard of the Invaders” published a video, and only 25 minutes later, “Bani Walid Against Criminals” posted the same video.
Similarly, “Qalam Al-Zawiya Al-Anqa” published a video of a raid on a factory accused of selling groundwater as Zamzam water. Only 11 minutes later, “Ibn Al-Zawiya Al-Anqa” published the same video.
Images 36 and 37: Show synchronised publication of identical content by network accounts.
Images 38 and 39: Further examples of synchronised publication of identical content.
The account “Shabab Al-Khoms” published a video of a horrific traffic accident. Only 14 minutes later, the account “Bahr Al-Qarabulli” published the same video.
A high degree of coordination and synchronisation is therefore clearly visible across these accounts.
This pattern is not limited to pages with similar names. It appears throughout the network, with publication times differing by only a few minutes.
Images 40 and 41: Show synchronised publication of identical content by network accounts.
Our team also identified a video circulated by a large number of network accounts claiming that Brigade 444 had arrested an African woman accused of witchcraft.
Accounts sharing the video included, for example, “Souq Al-Jumaa History,” “Men of Zawiyat Al-Mahjoub Al-Jihad,” “11 June Souq Al-Jumaa,” and “Tripoli Street Misrata.”
After verification and research, the team found that the video had previously been published on Brigade 444’s Facebook account.
We also identified a video published by numerous network accounts that had previously appeared on Brigade 444’s Facebook account. It claimed that two African nationals had been arrested in the Ain Zara area after allegedly stealing belongings from a home.
Accounts sharing it included “Martyrs of Tajoura,” “Al-Mashashiya Past,” “Awlad Saqr Tribes,” and “Souq Al-Jumaa Arada.”
The report says this suggests the possibility of a pre-existing relationship and coordination, with the potential involvement of the brigade in the network’s activity.
Sponsored Advertisements Reveal a Connecting Thread
Through deeper investigation, the observatory team discovered active sponsored advertisements across a large number of the network’s Facebook pages, indicating that the campaign is being financed and supported by some entity.
The investigation found that all active sponsored advertisements on network pages contained material supporting the narrative of expelling refugees, inciting hostility against them and attacking them.
This behaviour represents an additional dimension of the network’s activity: its accounts were not simply publishing content but were paying money to promote material inciting hostility against refugees.
Images 44–47: Show sponsored advertisements published on some network pages.
The observatory team noticed that many of these advertisements were highly similar despite appearing on different pages.
Some posts were sponsored by more than one network account, demonstrating coordination and an effort to push the content intensively toward the public.
Images 48 and 49: Similar sponsored advertisements on network pages.
Images 50 and 51: Similar sponsored advertisements on network pages.
Images 52 and 53: Similar sponsored advertisements on network pages.
These sponsored advertisements violate Meta’s advertising policies—Meta being the owner of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp—which require advertisers not to engage in unsafe or discriminatory practices, seek to protect people from fraud and deception, and promote a positive user experience by prohibiting advertisements containing emotionally provocative content, according to the company.
Meta’s policies also prohibit advertisers from using advertisements for hateful conduct, discriminating against people, or encouraging discrimination based on race, colour, origin or religion.
They also prohibit advertisements that facilitate or promote criminal or harmful activities targeting people or property.
Nevertheless, according to the investigation, the company had taken no clear action regarding these violations.
While most of the sponsored advertisements reviewed by the team contained no information that could help identify the party associated with running them, disclosure information for two advertisements published through the pages “Beit Al-Mal Street, Souq Al-Jumaa” and “Souq Al-Jumaa Panorama” revealed additional information about the advertiser.
This led investigators to the first common connection that could be traced beyond the pages publishing the material.
The advertising disclosures for these two ads listed “Ekhlas Albayan LLC”, together with the website ekhlaselbayan.com, as the advertiser.
The appearance of this name represented the first traceable indicator extending beyond the network itself.
The investigation therefore shifted from monitoring pages and content to attempting to identify the entities behind the paid promotional activity.
Who Is “Ekhlas Albayan”?
Using the website address displayed in the sponsored advertisement disclosure—ekhlaselbayan.com—the team located a Facebook page called “Ekhlas Albayan for Advertising and Publicity,” which listed the same website in its contact details.
The page describes itself as a company specialising in advertising and publicity, providing services to companies and owners of both small and large commercial projects, including digital marketing and advertising campaign management.
The page’s transparency information shows that it was created in September 2021 and underwent five name changes between its creation and April 2022, before settling on its current name, “Ekhlas Albayan for Advertising and Publicity.”
According to the company’s Facebook information, it is based in Libya, specifically in the Souq Al-Jumaa neighbourhood of Tripoli.
Images 56 and 57: Show information from the company’s Facebook page.
The observatory team attempted to access the website listed on the company’s page in order to obtain more information, but the website was not functioning.
The company’s services focus on managing advertising campaigns and increasing reach and views across social-media platforms.
It offers three main packages that differ according to campaign duration and expected number of views, with prices ranging from 50 Libyan dinars to 1,710 Libyan dinars, and promises that advertisements can reach hundreds of thousands of views.
The information uncovered by the investigation does not prove that Ekhlas Albayan for Advertising and Publicity operates the network or stands behind its content.
However, the appearance of the company’s information in several sponsored advertisements connected to the network makes it the most significant common lead that investigators were able to trace at the time.
The findings indicate the possibility that the company played an operational or management role in some of the advertising campaigns associated with the network, whether as the party implementing the campaigns or as an advertising and promotional service provider acting on behalf of another entity behind the content promoted by these pages.
However, the exact nature of the relationship between the company and those operating the network, and the limits of the company’s role, remained unclear at the time the investigation was published.
Table showing the most prominent accounts active within the network:
Name | Number of Followers | Date of Creation | ID |
35K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589132794001 | |
53K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588937173028 | |
39K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589049911664 | |
34K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589345399142 | |
50K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589475173992 | |
37K | 8 مايو 2026 | 61589641340971 | |
35K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589213787806 | |
50K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589202035687 | |
46K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589353738962 | |
43K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589065864921 | |
51K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589262452702 | |
48K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588894782679 | |
39K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589189189216 | |
40K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589079970682 | |
52K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589258973066 | |
45K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589061761562 | |
33K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588952141941 | |
45K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589178066222 | |
46K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61588970865349 | |
47K | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589372360073 | |
52K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61589463684162 | |
50K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589161507449 | |
36K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589254117299 | |
43K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588913683575 | |
50K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61588929527923 | |
46K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589320435829 | |
48K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589536315289 | |
31K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589345343737 | |
50K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588910653568 | |
32K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589428380072 | |
43K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589095353435 | |
50K | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589405184067 | |
41K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589057255244 | |
51K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589403901170 | |
54K | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589469024265 | |
39K | 5 مايو 2026 | 61588963875910 | |
50K | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588930933089 | |
51K | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589069078520 | |
38K | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589394871059 | |
33K | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589216458309 | |
48k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589310504433 | |
49k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589212470370 | |
48k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61588932402986 | |
50k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589302436658 | |
50k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589348752175 | |
35k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588876783299 | |
45k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589196091377 | |
35k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589269615483 | |
48k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589290434756 | |
31k | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589484380579 | |
46k | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589370598492 | |
29k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589239619466 | |
50k | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589356496003 | |
30k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589190269360 | |
50k | 6 مايو 2026 | 61589461074340 | |
34k | 4 مايو 2026 | 61589411663607 | |
43k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589035385855 | |
37k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589372872942 | |
46k | 7 مايو 2026 | 61589296175686 | |
43k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588804781546 | |
49k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589128563897 | |
39k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588838654459 | |
48k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589330125448 | |
44k | 3 مايو 2026 | 61589313115916 | |
49k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588894302317 | |
50k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588951149124 | |
46k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589336362709 | |
37k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589050865188 | |
39k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61589386430821 | |
39k | 2 مايو 2026 | 61588976588168 |
English page name | Followers | Created | ID | Link |
Bani Walid — Graveyard of the Invaders | 35K | 3 May 2026 | 61589132794001 | Open page ↗ |
Bani Walid Against Criminals | 53K | 3 May 2026 | 61588937173028 | Open page ↗ |
Sons of Defiant Misrata | 39K | 5 May 2026 | 61589049911664 | Open page ↗ |
Son of Al-Zawiya Al-Anqa | 34K | 5 May 2026 | 61589345399142 | Open page ↗ |
Tripoli Tower | 50K | 6 May 2026 | 61589475173992 | Open page ↗ |
Free People of Al-Asabaa | 37K | 8 May 2026 | 61589641340971 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa — Arada | 35K | 2 May 2026 | 61589213787806 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Dhahra, Tripoli | 50K | 6 May 2026 | 61589202035687 | Open page ↗ |
Youth of Al-Khoms | 46K | 6 May 2026 | 61589353738962 | Open page ↗ |
Abu Salim — Past and Present | 43K | 2 May 2026 | 61589065864921 | Open page ↗ |
Martyr Shrikhan — The Revolution | 51K | 5 May 2026 | 61589262452702 | Open page ↗ |
Youth of Abu Salim | 48K | 2 May 2026 | 61588894782679 | Open page ↗ |
Simafero Al-Hurriya — Al-Shatt | 39K | 2 May 2026 | 61589189189216 | Open page ↗ |
Awlad Saqr Tribes | 40K | 5 May 2026 | 61589079970682 | Open page ↗ |
Sea of Qarabulli | 52K | 6 May 2026 | 61589258973066 | Open page ↗ |
Men of Zawiyat Al-Mahjoub — Al-Jihad | 45K | 5 May 2026 | 61589061761562 | Open page ↗ |
Saif Al-Islam Al-Tarhouni | 33K | 3 May 2026 | 61588952141941 | Open page ↗ |
Pen of Al-Zawiya Al-Anqa | 45K | 5 May 2026 | 61589178066222 | Open page ↗ |
Tripoli Street — Misrata | 46K | 5 May 2026 | 61588970865349 | Open page ↗ |
Gharyan at the Top | 47K | 4 May 2026 | 61589372360073 | Open page ↗ |
Sword of Misrata | 52K | 5 May 2026 | 61589463684162 | Open page ↗ |
Martyrs’ Square | 50K | 6 May 2026 | 61589161507449 | Open page ↗ |
Green Bani Walid | 36K | 7 May 2026 | 61589254117299 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Mashashiya Against Criminals | 43K | 3 May 2026 | 61588913683575 | Open page ↗ |
Clock Tower Street | 50K | 6 May 2026 | 61588929527923 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Awiniya Al-Hadath | 46K | 3 May 2026 | 61589320435829 | Open page ↗ |
Misrata — Volcano of Rage | 48K | 7 May 2026 | 61589536315289 | Open page ↗ |
Misrata — Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous | 31K | 7 May 2026 | 61589345343737 | Open page ↗ |
Tarhouna Al-Sharshara | 50K | 3 May 2026 | 61588910653568 | Open page ↗ |
Sons of Misrata | 32K | 7 May 2026 | 61589428380072 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa Panorama | 43K | 2 May 2026 | 61589095353435 | Open page ↗ |
City of Al-Rajban | 50K | 4 May 2026 | 61589405184067 | Open page ↗ |
Zawiyat Al-Dahmani at the Top | 41K | 2 May 2026 | 61589057255244 | Open page ↗ |
Nalut Al-Jihad | 51K | 7 May 2026 | 61589403901170 | Open page ↗ |
Green Square | 54K | 6 May 2026 | 61589469024265 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Dafniya Gate | 39K | 5 May 2026 | 61588963875910 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Mashashiya — The Past | 50K | 3 May 2026 | 61588930933089 | Open page ↗ |
Zintan Tribes | 51K | 4 May 2026 | 61589069078520 | Open page ↗ |
Hay Al-Andalus Speaks | 38K | 7 May 2026 | 61589394871059 | Open page ↗ |
Eastern Iveco | 33K | 2 May 2026 | 61589216458309 | Open page ↗ |
Youth of Al-Hadba Al-Izz | 48K | 2 May 2026 | 61589310504433 | Open page ↗ |
Tarhouna Libya | 49K | 3 May 2026 | 61589212470370 | Open page ↗ |
Tarhouna Fam Malgha | 48K | 3 May 2026 | 61588932402986 | Open page ↗ |
Central Tarhouna | 50K | 3 May 2026 | 61589302436658 | Open page ↗ |
Beit Al-Mal Street — Souq Al-Jumaa | 50K | 2 May 2026 | 61589348752175 | Open page ↗ |
Sons of Souq Al-Jumaa | 35K | 2 May 2026 | 61588876783299 | Open page ↗ |
Warfalla Tribes | 45K | 3 May 2026 | 61589196091377 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Tarsana — Souq Al-Jumaa | 35K | 2 May 2026 | 61589269615483 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa Has Spoken | 48K | 2 May 2026 | 61589290434756 | Open page ↗ |
Defiant Gharyan | 31K | 4 May 2026 | 61589484380579 | Open page ↗ |
Zawiyat Al-Dahmani Speaks | 46K | 6 May 2026 | 61589370598492 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Dhahra — Bani Walid | 29K | 3 May 2026 | 61589239619466 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Rajban — Minaret of Jihad | 50K | 4 May 2026 | 61589356496003 | Open page ↗ |
Abu Salim with the Libyan Army | 30K | 2 May 2026 | 61589190269360 | Open page ↗ |
Zliten Glory | 50K | 6 May 2026 | 61589461074340 | Open page ↗ |
Al-Zintani Al-Dawla | 34K | 4 May 2026 | 61589411663607 | Open page ↗ |
Awlad Shatt Al-Hanshir | 43K | 2 May 2026 | 61589035385855 | Open page ↗ |
Martyrs of Tajoura | 37K | 3 May 2026 | 61589372872942 | Open page ↗ |
Masked Men of Zuwara | 46K | 7 May 2026 | 61589296175686 | Open page ↗ |
Simafero Belhaj — Souq Al-Jumaa | 43K | 2 May 2026 | 61588804781546 | Open page ↗ |
New Qasr Bin Ghashir | 49K | 3 May 2026 | 61589128563897 | Open page ↗ |
11 June — Souq Al-Jumaa | 39K | 2 May 2026 | 61588838654459 | Open page ↗ |
Farjan Tarhouna | 48K | 3 May 2026 | 61589330125448 | Open page ↗ |
Tarhouna — Capital of Olives | 44K | 3 May 2026 | 61589313115916 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa with Al-Arba’at | 49K | 2 May 2026 | 61588894302317 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa Al-Marsi | 50K | 2 May 2026 | 61588951149124 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa Al-Amrous | 46K | 2 May 2026 | 61589336362709 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa Al-Shatt | 37K | 2 May 2026 | 61589050865188 | Open page ↗ |
Souq Al-Jumaa History | 39K | 2 May 2026 | 61589386430821 | Open page ↗ |
Sons of Shurfat Al-Mallaha | 39K | 2 May 2026 | 61588976588168 | Open page ↗ |
Refugees in Libya — Context and an Open Investigative Question
The findings of Beam Reports raise an additional question which Refugees in Libya believes warrants further investigation.
The geographic concentration revealed in Beam’s data is striking. Of the 70 coordinated Facebook pages identified by the investigation, at least 13 explicitly carry names connected to Souq al-Juma in Tripoli. All thirteen were created on 2 May 2026, during the first day of the network’s documented creation period. Beam further found that the only advertiser information it could trace beyond the anonymous pages emerged from two Souq al-Juma-branded accounts. Meta’s advertising disclosures identified Ekhlas Albayan LLC, an advertising company whose own Facebook information places it in Souq al-Juma, as the advertiser behind those promotions. Beam expressly cautions that this does not demonstrate that the company created or controls the network.
The timing deserves attention. The pages appeared between 2 and 8 May 2026. Seventeen days after the first Souq al-Juma pages were created, the International Criminal Court opened its confirmation-of-charges hearing against Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, a former senior official of the Special Deterrence Force/RADA accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes connected to Mitiga Prison. The hearing date of 19 May had been publicly known since December 2025.
Souq al-Juma is also the historic stronghold of RADA. The force developed from armed formations rooted in the neighbourhood and continues to exercise substantial security influence there. Official reporting as recently as August 2026 records cooperation between the Souq al-Juma municipality and RADA units.
This geographic and temporal overlap does not establish that RADA, its leadership, the supporters of El Hishri, or Ekhlas Albayan directed the anti-refugee network.
No evidence presently available to Refugees in Libya establishes such a chain of command or financing.
It does, however, raise questions that have become harder to ignore as events have developed.
On 3 June, the Harak Abnaa Souq al-Juma publicly rejected the alleged “settlement” of migrants and warned of escalating consequences. Beam documented Souq al-Juma-branded pages promoting the subsequent anti-migrant demonstrations and publishing material demanding action against Africans.
Meanwhile, opposition within Souq al-Juma to the ICC proceedings against El Hishri has persisted. The area’s Social Council publicly condemned his transfer to the Court in December 2025. After the ICC announced on 14 September 2026 that his trial would begin on 4 May 2027, supporters again gathered in Souq al-Juma on 20 September to demand his return to Libya and denounce the proceedings.
Refugees in Libya has also observed large public banners in Tripoli calling for El Hishri’s release. These should be understood alongside—not automatically attributed to—the wider mobilisation surrounding his case.
The unanswered question is therefore not whether these facts prove a connection; they do not. The question is whether the unusual concentration of digital infrastructure, paid advertising and anti-refugee mobilisation in the social and territorial heartland of RADA, immediately before a major ICC proceeding against one of its former senior officials, is coincidental or reflects relationships that have not yet been uncovered.
Establishing that would require evidence concerning who commissioned the advertisements, who paid Ekhlas Albayan, who administered the 70 pages, whether administrators overlapped, and whether any financial, organisational or personal links connect those actors to political, security or armed structures in Souq al-Juma.
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